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This research extends our earlier work to improve the security of electric 
power grids subject to disruptions caused by terrorist attacks.  To identify critical 
system components (e.g., transmission lines, generators, transformers), we devise 
bilevel optimization models that identify maximally disruptive attack plans for 
terrorists, who are assumed to have limited offensive resources.  A new model 
captures the dynamics of system operation as a network is repaired after an 
attack, and we adapt an earlier heuristic for that model’s solution.  We also 
develop a new, mixed-integer programming model (MIP) for the problem; a 
model that can be solved exactly using standard optimization software, at least in 
theory.  Preliminary testing shows that optimal solutions are readily achieved for 
certain standard test problems, although not for the largest ones, which the 
heuristic seems to handle well.  However, optimal solutions do provide a 
benchmark to measure the accuracy of the heuristic:  The heuristic typically 
achieves optimality gaps of less than 10%, but occasionally the gap reaches 25%.  
Research will continue to refine the heuristic algorithm, the MIP formulation, 
and the algorithms to solve it.  We also demonstrate progress made towards a 
graphical user interface that allows performing our interdiction analysis in a 
friendly environment. 
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 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This report documents the continuing research project entitled “Homeland Security Research 
And Technology Proposal (Optimizing Electric Grid Design Under Asymmetric Threat),” which 
is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs and Office of 
Domestic Preparedness. 
 
This research extends our previous effort aimed at developing new optimization models and 
methods for planning expansion and enhancements of electric power grids that improve 
robustness to potential disruptions caused by natural disasters, sabotage and, especially, terrorist 
attacks.  The research reported here shows the progress made in different areas comprising 
modeling, algorithms and their implementation, testing, and user interfaces. 
 
The document is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of project 
accomplishments to date.  Sections 3 through 7 describe this year’s activities in detail.  In 
particular, Section 3 describes our model of post-attack system restoration over time, and an 
associated solution procedure.  Section 4 focuses on a new model representation as a standard 
mixed-integer program.  Computational results for these models are presented in Section 5, 
including comparisons with earlier results.  Section 6 presents an overview of our new “VEGA” 
decision-support system, which includes database and graphical user-interface tools, along with 
an optimization module.  Other activities are summarized in Section 7.  Section 8 presents an 
overview of the work intended for year 2004.  We conclude in Section 9 with the list of criteria 
used to assess the value of our project to Homeland Security. 
 
2.  OBJECTIVE AND SUMMARY OF WORK COMPLETED 
 
Our project develops new mathematical models and optimization methods for robust planning 
of electrical power grids, focusing on security and reliability, with special emphasis on potential 
disruptions caused by terrorist attacks.  We refer to our previous proposal [Salmeron and Wood, 
2002-I] and references therein for detailed background on the problem of electric power-grid 
vulnerability. 
 
A statement from the Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism 
[2002] succinctly states the motivation for our work: “The nation’s electric power systems must 
clearly be made more resilient to terrorist attack.”  This motivation has been further strengthened 
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 by the blackout, on 14 August 2003, in the Northeast U.S. electric power grid [U.S.-Canada 
Power System Outage Task Force, 2003].  Although the blackout was not instigated by terrorists, 
its cause appears to have been multiple failures of infrastructure elements in the transmission 
system, and our current research addresses precisely such situations. 
 
We also refer to our previous report [Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick, 2003-I], where we 
establish the mathematical foundations for the models and algorithms that we have enhanced in 
the research reported here. 
 
The following milestones have been achieved as the result of previous and current research 
(see proposals by Salmeron and Wood [2002-I], [2002-II]).  (Underlined items identify the most 
recent contributions.) 
 
(1) Formulation of mathematical models that represent the problem of optimally interdicting 
an electrical power grid.  A newer formulation includes system restoration over time. 
 
(2) Development of heuristics that identify highly disruptive attack plans to a specific electric 
power grid given limited interdiction resources.  Newer heuristics keep pace with the 
developing models and have been adapted to incorporate system restoration over time.  
This algorithm has been implemented using the General Algebraic Modeling Language 
software [GAMS, 1996]. 
 
(3) Incorporation of different measures of effectiveness, any of which can be optimized: 
• Short-term power disruption (MW); 
• Short-term cost ($/MW) over all consumer sectors; 
• Long-term energy disruption (MWh), including system restoration over time; and 
• Long-term cost ($) over all consumer sectors, including system restoration over time. 
 
(4) Development of techniques to convert models in (1) into standard mixed-integer 
programs that can be solved exactly.  This means that, not only we can determine “good” 
attack plans, as our heuristic approach (2) does, but we can prove that these plans are 
optimal.  In turn, this provides us with a precise measure of vulnerability.  We have 
implemented and solved the converted models using GAMS [1996]. 
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 (5) Solution to cases with up to 100 electrical buses (drawn from the IEEE Reliability Test 
Data [1999-I], [1999-II]). 
 
(6) Presentations in the Homeland Security Leadership Development (HSLD) seminars: 
• “Electric Power Grids Vulnerability,” CS4920, Naval Postgraduate School  
(3 December 2002). 
• “Vulnerability of Electric Power Grids,” CS3660, Naval Postgraduate School  
(18 June 2003). 
 
(7) Reports: 
• First-year report [Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick, 2003-I]. 
• Research Paper [Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick, 2003-II], accepted for publication in 
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. 
 
(8) Thesis students involvement: 
• Major Dimitrios Stathakos, Greek Army.  “An Enhanced Graphical User Interface for 
Analyzing the Vulnerability of Electrical Power Systems to Terrorist Attacks,” 
[Stathakos, 2003], graduated in December 2003. 
• LCDR Rogelio Alvarez, USN.  “Interdicting Electrical Power Grids,” graduation 
expected in March 2004. 
 
(9) Graphical User Interface (GUI) Development:  We realize the importance of enabling 
access to this type of analysis to a number of potential users, who are not necessarily 
familiar with the optimization arena.  To bridge this gap, we have initiated the design and 
implementation of the “Vulnerability of Electrical Power Grids Analyzer” (VEGA) 
system.  VEGA is an integrated tool, comprising a graphical user interface (GUI), a 
supporting database (DB) and the aforementioned optimization tools.  A preliminary Web 
page has been set up for this project [VEGA, 2003].  VEGA 1.0 is the first prototype of 
this system. 
 
We next describe the items (1)-(9) above in more detail. 
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 3.  MODELING RESTORATION AND ALGORITHMIC IMPLEMENTATION 
3.1 Previous Interdiction Model without Restoration 
The mathematical model we presented in our previous report [Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick, 
2003-I] attempts to maximize immediate electric power shedding by (optimally) selecting a set of 
interdictions given limited resources.  We refer to that report for a full description of its 
formulation, which can be shortly stated as the following Max-min (Mm) problem: 
 
)












Recall that, in this model, an interdiction plan is represented by the binary vector δ , whose  
k-th entry kδ  is 1 if component k of the system is attacked and is 0 otherwise.  For a given plan, 
the inner problem (called DC-OPF) is an optimal power-flow model [Wood and Wollenberg, 
1996, p. 514] that minimizes generation costs plus the penalty associated with unmet demand, 
together denoted by c .  Here, p represents power flows, generation outputs, phase angles, and 
“unmet demand,” i.e., the amount of load shed; c represents linearized generation costs and the 
costs of unmet demand.  The outer maximization chooses the most disruptive, resource-
constrained interdiction plan δ , where 
'p
∈ ∆ ∆  is a discrete set representing attacks that a terrorist 
group might be able to carry out.  In this model, g corresponds to a set of functions that are 
nonlinear in ( , . )δp
 
The inner problem involves a simplified optimal power-flow model, with constraint functions 
 that are, however, linear in p for a fixed )( ,δg p ˆ=δ δ . 
 
3.2 Interdiction Model with Restoration 
Overview 
Model (Mm) provides only a rough estimate of energy shedding and thus the true cost to 
society of an attack on a power grid.  This is because (Mm) is based on the system capability after 
the initial return to service of non-damaged equipment following an attack, disregarding medium- 
and long-term effects.  The only case in which this is not important is when the outage duration of 
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 all interdictable components in the system is the same, which seems unlikely (e.g., interdicted 
substations will, in general, take much longer to repair than interdicted lines). 
 
We have extended model (Mm) to handle the cost and timing of repairs, which allows us to 
obtain interdiction plans seeking to maximize total cost as the system is restored over time.  
Essentially, this model measures “total weighted energy,” where weights represent costs of lost 
energy to various customer sectors and possibly other factors. 
 
This is accomplished by using interdiction constructs to couple instances of DC-OPF, one for 
each system state that represents a stage or “time period” of system repair.  In outline, the model is: 
 
)






















Model (Mm′) extends (Mm) to incorporate the hourly cost of power flow, , in each time 
period t, multiplied by the period’s duration in hours .  Figure 1 shows the difference between 




The model could be further extended to incorporate “sub-time periods” through load duration 
curves, but we have not yet explored this possibility; all loads are held constant over time. 
 
Following the notation and conventions in our previous report (see Appendix A), we next 
describe the full model that incorporates system restoration.  We first need to introduce some 
additional notation: 
 
T = set of periods, for t T  ∈
* * *L G B Sξ = ∪ ∪ ∪ * , set of all (directly) interdictable elements 
( )Dur e =  Duration (hours) of outage for element e ξ∈ , if attacked 
tD = Duration (hours) of time period t, for t T∈  
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 ,
1,  if component  remains unrepaired in time period  after being attacked







for t T , ξ∈ . 
 
Remark:  In the above notation Line,t lβ , Bus,t iβ , Gen,t gβ , and Sub,t sβ  denote ,t eβ  when e=l is a line, or 


























Figure 1.  The model without restoration provides the optimal interdiction plan according to 
instantaneous power shed, after initial return to service of non-damaged equipment (left).  The model 
with restoration over time, accounts for energy disruption (right).
The following algorithm constructs the set of time periods, T, based on the different outage 
durations for all interdictable elements.  In the course of the algorithm, tD  and ,t eη  are also 
constructed: 
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Initialization: ,  ,  0, 0;
While :
           1
           
1,  if 
          
0,  otherwise
           min ( )
           ( )
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Due to different outage duration for the system components, we need to establish which 
components might be out of service during each time period.  For example, if a line l can be 
interdicted, but it is not connected to an interdictable bus, then the line is guaranteed to be in 
service after Dur(l) hours, independent of whether it is attacked or not.  At this point, the 
following definitions are needed: 
 
**
tL =  Set of lines l that could be out of service in period t following a direct or indirect 
interdiction. 
**
tG =  Set of generators g that could be out of service in period t following a direct or indirect 
interdiction. 
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0, otherwise
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 ∈= 




(Hereafter, equations in boxes represent final constraints in our models.) 
 










t g t g i c t i
t T g i c
D h P f S
θ ∈Γ
∈∆ ∈
 ⋅ +  ∑ ∑ ∑∑δ , ,c
      
(I-R.0) 
 
where, as in the case without time periods, we attempt to minimize power generation cost plus 
load shedding cost, but this time these terms are specified by time period and weighed by its 
duration, in order to account for energy cost. 
 
∈ ∆δ  still represents the resource-constrained interdictions that a terrorist group might be 
able to carry out, and is the same as in the case without time periods.  Or, explicitly: 
 
              
* * * *
Gen Gen Line Line Bus Bus Sub Sub
g g l l i i s s
g G l L i I s S
M M M Mδ δ δ δ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
+ + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ M≤
    
(I-R.1) 
 
All δ -variables are binary




 ( , , , )Gen Linet t t tP P Sθ ∈ Γ  represents the time-dependent decision variables of the inner  
DC-OPF-R (DC-OPF model with restoration).  These constraints (and the associated duals, 
denoted as π  with appropriate sub- and super-indices) are explicitly stated as: 
 






, , ( ) , ( ) , ,
, ,
( )(1 ) (1 )





Line Line Line Line Bus Bus
t l l t o l t d l l t l l t i i
i I l L
Sub Sub Line Line A
t s s t ll ll t l
s S l L ll L ll L
P B
l t
θ θ λ β δ β δ
,β δ β δ π
∈ ∈
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= − − − ⋅
− − ∀ ∀
∏
∏ ∏
   (IDC-R.1) 
 
• Balance equation for the bus i in period t: 
 
, , , , , ,
( ) ( )
 , (
i
Gen Line Line Bal
t g t l t l t i c i c t i
g G l o l i l d l i c c
P P P S d i t π
∈ = =
− + + = ∀∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , )     (IDC-R.2) 
 






                                ,                                               ( )
(1 )                  , ,  =1                           
LLine Line
t l l t t l
Line Line Line Line
t l l l t l
P P t l L











     ( )
(1 )                   , , ,  , 1              ( )
(1 )                   , , , , 1                 
LCap
t l
Line Line Bus Bus Bus LB
t l l i i t i t l i
Line Line Sub Sub
t l l s s t s
P P t l i i I l L




≤ − ∀ ∈ ∈ =










(1 )                   , , , , 1           ( )
                               ,                                 
LS
t l s
Line Line Line Par Line LL
t l l ll l t ll t l ll
Line Line
t l l t
P P t l ll ll L ll L
P P t l L
π
δ β≤ − ∀ ∈ ∈ =








           ( )
(1 )                 , ,  =1                              ( )
(1 )                  , , ,  , 1   
L
t l
Line Line Line Line LCap
t l l l t l t l
Line Line Bus Bus Bus
t l l i i t i
P P t l L





+≥ − − ∀ ∈







         ( )
(1 )                  , , , , 1               ( )
(1 )                 , , , , 1 (
LB
t l i
Line Line Sub Sub LS
t l l s s t s t l s
Line Line Line Par Line
t l l ll l t ll t l ll
P P t l s s S l L





+≥ − − ∀ ∈ ∈ =





   (IDCR.3) 
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 It is worth noting that, for the each line l, we need five constraints to specify its maximum 
capacity in period t, and another five constraints for the minimum capacity.  For example, 
consider the case where a line l can be interdicted, but it is not connected to an interdictable bus 
or substation.  Then, l for some of the first periods t (e.g., t=1,2,3), but since the line is 
guaranteed to be back in service after Dur(l) hours,  for the rest of the periods  







,                                 4,5,6
Line Line
t l lP P t≤ =  
, (1 )                 1,2,3
Line Line Line
t l l lP P tδ≤ − =  
 
On the other hand, if the line is connected to an interdictable bus, and the bus outage covers, 
for example, periods t=1,...,5, the constraints would be: 
 
,                                 6
Line Line
t l lP P t≤ =  
, (1 )                 1,2,3
Line Line Line
t l l lP P tδ≤ − =  
, (1 )                  1,2,3,4,5
Line Line Bus
t l l iP P tδ≤ − =  
 







                                  ,                                         ( )
(1 )                    , | , =1                         ( )
t
GGen Gen
t g g t g
Gen Gen Gen Gen G
t g g g t g t g
P P t g G





≤ − ∀ ∈ π
*
, ( ) , ( )
*
, ( ( )) , ( ) ,
(1 )                    , | ( ) , =1                    ( )
(1 )                 , | ( ( )) , =1               ( )
Gen Gen Bus Bus GB
t g g i g t i g t g
Gen Gen Sub Sub GS
t g g s i g t s g t g
P t g i g I
P P t g s i g S
δ β
δ β
≤ − ∀ ∈
≤ − ∀ ∈
,π
π
      (IDC-R.4) 
 
• Demand shedding at bus i for customer c: 
 
, , , , ,                                ,        ( )
Load
t i c i c t i cS d i c π≤ ∀  (IDC-R.5) 
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0                                  ,
  unrestricted                   ,
0                                   , ,





















In summary, our interdiction model with restoration, (I-R), becomes: 
 




t t t tP P S θδ
                            subject to: 
  (I-R.1), (I-R.2) and 
         (IDC-R.1) to (IDC-R.6) 
 
3.3 Heuristic Algorithm for the Interdiction Problem with Restoration 
The algorithm that we use to solve (I-R), i.e., a problem without restoration, is schematically 
depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
 Maximize the Value of the Assets 
to be Interdicted (excluding 
previously explored solutions) 
Solve the DC-OPF for the present 
grid configuration 
Based on present and previous flow 
patterns, assign a “Value” to each 
interdictable asset 
Figure 2:  Interdiction algorithm framework (without restoration). 
 
This algorithm first solves DC-OPF assuming no attacks.  The power-flow pattern is used to 
assign relative values to all the components of the power grid.  These values are used to maximize 
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 the estimated value of the assets to be interdicted, while ensuring that the resources required for 
the interdiction plan are not exceeded.  With this interdiction plan, we modify the right-hand side 
of DC-OPF model (disregarding restoration) and obtain its solution.  In this case, we expect part 
of the load to be shed.  The process continues by finding alternative sets of valuable assets to 
interdict that have not been identified at earlier iterations, and by evaluating load shedding for 
each of these interdiction plans.  More details on the algorithm can be found in Salmeron et al. 
[2003-II]. 
 
We can adapt this algorithm to the model with restoration by solving the new DC-OPF 
problem in the upper box in Figure 2, assuming that all δ -variables have been fixed (say ˆ=δ δ , 
satisfying (I-R.1) and (I-R.2)).  That problem, denoted DC-OPF-R( ), becomes: δˆ
 




t t tP P S tθ
(I-R.0) 
   subject to:  (IDC-R.1) to (IDC-R.6) 
 
DC-OPF-R( ) (called “sub-problem” in the above algorithm, for a specific interdiction plan 
), provides the joint power flow patterns for a number of system “stages”:  one for each 
restoration period.  Notice that DC-OPF-R( ) decomposes into  sub-sub-problems, each of 
which consists of an instance of DC-OPF with some subset of system components being “out of 
service.”  Outaged components are determined by δ  (interdictions) and by 
δˆ
δˆ
δˆ | T |
ˆ
,t eβ , which informs 
DC-OPF about the status of interdicted components in period t. 
 
In addition to this modification, our heuristic algorithm also redefines the concept of “value,” 
which is used to determine which grid components appear more attractive for interdiction in each 
iteration.  We maintain the same concept of value (denoted as a vector V) as in our previous work 
(again, see details in Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick [2003-I]), but noticing that these values must 
be multiplied by (for a generic component, e) in order to account for energy-based 
values.  Therefore, assuming the definitions of value from previous work, the new definition of 
value for every generic component e is: 
( )Dur e
 
V Restoration(e) = Dur(e) × V No-Restoration(e) 
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 With these values, the “master problem” can find potentially good interdiction plans δ that 
have not been explored yet.  The master problem (MP-R) at a specific iteration 
ˆ
τ  is: 
 
ˆMP-R( , ) : maxτ τ τ δ∆ ⋅
δ
V V  
  subject to: 

































+ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∈
+ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∩ ∈
′+ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∩ ∈
+ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∩ ∈












, ' , '
, ' , '
| |
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Gen Gen Line Line
g g l l
g l
Bus Bus Sub Sub








δ δ δ δ





− + − +






               
(MP-R.2) 
where ˆ τ∆ is a set that contains the information on all previously-generated interdiction plans.  The 
first block of constraints (MP-R.1) are valid inequalities to ensure that a system component is not 
interdicted if it has been indirectly interdicted by an element to which it is connected.  (Remark:  
The valid inequalities (MP-R.2) also need to be adjusted when considering system restoration 
because they were based on arguments that ignored repairs over time.)  The second block  
(MP-R.1) are super-valid inequalities that account for previously generated solutions in the 
algorithm, in order to always examine alternative solutions. 
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 Figure 3 sketches a framework for the new algorithm. 
 
 
Figure 3:  Interdiction algorithm framework (with restoration). 
MP-R:  Maximize the Value of the 
Assets to be Interdicted (excluding 
previously explored solutions) 
Solve the DC-OPF-R for the given 
Interdiction Plan:   
Solve |T| DC-OPF problems 
Based on present and previous flow 
patterns, assign an (energy-based) 
“Value” to each interdictable asset 
 
 
A more detailed version of this algorithm (I-ALG-R) follows: 
I-ALG-R 
Input:  Grid data; Interdiction data;  max (iteration limit). τ
Output:   is a feasible interdiction plan causing a disruption with cost *δˆ *γ .  If the algorithm exits 




-  (initial attack plan). 1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , , ) ( , , ,Gen Line Bus Sub← ←δ δ δ δ δ 0 0 0 0)
1ˆ-  (best plan so far) and  *ˆ ←δ δ 1 1ˆ ˆ{ }.∆ ← δ
-  (cost of the best plan so far). *  0γ ←
- 1.τ ←  
 
Subproblem: 
- Solve ˆDC-OPF-R( )τδ  for objective value ˆ( )τγ δ  and solution 
, , ˆ ˆˆ( , , ,Genˆ ˆ Line )τ τ τ τ τP S θ=P P . 
- If *ˆ( ) >τγ γδ , then * ˆ( )τγ ← γ δ , and *ˆ ˆτ←δ δ . 
-  If maxτ τ= , then Print ( , *δˆ *γ ) and halt. 
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 Master Problem: 
- Compute estimated values: 
( ), , ,, , ,Gen Line Bus Sub,τ τ τ τ≡V V V V V τ  ←  ( ), , ,
1






∑ V V V V ′ . 
- Solve MP-  for ˆR( , )τ τ∆V 1ˆ t+δ . 
- If MP- ˆR( , )τ τ∆V  is infeasible, then Print (δ , *ˆ *γ ) and halt. 
-  1 1ˆˆ ˆ { }τ τ τ+ +∆ ← ∆ ∪ δ .
- 1.τ τ← +  
- Return to Subproblem. 
4.  MIXED-INTEGER REFORMULATION OF THE INTERDICTION MODEL 
4.1 Preliminary Ideas 
We would prefer to convert the model (I-R) into a standard (minimizing or maximizing) 
mixed-integer program (MIP) because a wealth of techniques exist to solve such models 
efficiently.  (I-R) possesses several features that make this conversion difficult, however: 
 
• (I-R) is as a max-min problem, not a simple minimization or maximization.  This 
difficulty can be overcome by “dualizing” the inner minimization (DC-OPF-R).  This 
converts (I-R) into max-max problem, i.e., a “simple” maximization.  However, as 
we will see later, this conversion leads to other difficulties that must be overcome. 
 
• (I-R) is highly non-linear due to the presence of multiple products of variables 
associated with the admittance equation (IDC-R.1). 
 
The following two ideas enable us to convert (I-R) into a MIP: 
 
(a) Dropping equality non-linear constraints: 
 
Consider an admittance equation for a generic line, with potential interdiction, represented as 
a non-linear equality of the form: 
 
1 2( )(1 )(1a bP B ),θ θ δ δ= − − −
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 along with capacity constraints: 
 
1(1 ) P P δ≤ − and 2(1 ) P P δ≤ −  
1(1 ) P P δ≥ − − and 2(1 ). P P δ≥ − −  
 
Here, , P aθ  and bθ  are continuous decision variables representing power flow on the line 
and phase angles at buses a, b, respectively; 1δ  and 2δ  are binary decision variables representing 
two possible ways to interdict the line, say, attacking the line directly and attacking one of the 
buses the line is connected to. 
 
When both 1δ  and 2δ
 
are 0, the admittance equation and capacity constraints become:  
( )a bP B θ θ= − , P P≤ , P ≥ −P , which is the usual power flow admittance equation and 
capacity constraint.  On the other hand, if either 1δ or 2δ
 
equals 1, indicating an interdiction has 
occurred, the above equations become:  0P = , 0P ≤ , , which is the desired effectthere 
is no power flow on the line, while 
0≥P
aθ  and bθ  may vary independently now. 
 
Remark:  It does not suffice to set 0P ≤  and 
 
 using the capacity constraints only.  The 
reason is that although this would imply 
0P ≥
0P = , the admittance constraint would become 
0 ( a bB )θ θ= − , forcing a bθ θ= , which is not necessarily optimal. 
 
To avoid the nonlinearities in the admittance equation, we can establish two constraints that 
enforce ( a bP B )θ θ= −  when all δ -variables are 0, and “drop” this constraint when any of the 
δ -variables is 1.  Let abθ  be an upper bound on the absolute value of the maximum phase angle 




( ) ( )
( )(1 )(1 )







θ θ δ δθ θ δ δ θ θ δ
− − ≤ += − − − ≡  − − ≥ − + δ .        (L.I) 
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Notice that when both 1δ and 2δ
 
are 0, the two linear inequalities (L.I) yield precisely 
( )a bP B 0θ θ− − = .  If either 1δ or 2δ
 
equals 1, the upper and lower bound limits on the 
 constraints are sufficiently large that they can never bind, i.e., the original constraints vanish as 
they should. 
 
(b) Linearizing cross-products: 
 
In the development that follows, we encounter a number of cross-products of the form δπ , 
where δ  is a 0-1 variable, representing interdiction, and π  is a continuous, non-negative or  
non-positive variable representing the dual variable for a line capacity constraint like those in 
(IDC-R.3). 
 
For simplicity, let us assume that 0π ≥  and that an upper bound π π≥  is known.  The π  
bound can be established by analyzing the maximum benefit per unit that we could obtain by 
increasing the line capacity.  Assuming that the largest penalty for failing to meet the demand 
( ,,max i ci c f ) is greater than the maximum generating cost ( max gg h ), a bound that would work in 
most cases is ,,max i ci c fπ = .  A more conservative, but generally valid, bound is 
, ,,
ax mini c i ci ci c,2 m f fπ = ⋅ − . 
 
If we define a new continuous variable v δπ= , we can represent the cross product in linear 
form as: 
 











≤ ≤≡ ≥ − − ≤ ≤ ≥
δ          (L.II) 
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0,         
0
         
0
                           (1 )
         0


















δ π π π ππδ π ππ
π π δ ππ π π πδ π π ππ π
≤ ≤  = = ⇒ ⇒≥ −   ∈≤  ≤ ≤ ≤  ≥ ≥ − − → ≤ ≤ ≤  ≤  =≥    = ⇒ ≥ ⇒  ∈≤ ≤ ≥ 
 
4.2 Linearizing Admittance Equations 





, , ( ) , ( ) , ,
, ,
( )(1 ) (1 )





Line Line Line Line Bus Bus
t l l t o l t d l l t l l t i i
i I l L
Sub Sub Line Line A
t s s t ll ll t l
s S l L ll L ll L
P B
l t
θ θ λ β δ β δ
,β δ β δ π
∈ ∈
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= − − − ⋅
− − ∀ ∀
∏
∏ ∏
   (IDC-R.1) 
 




, , ( ) , ( ) , , , ,
, , ( ) , ( ) ,




Line Line Line Line Bus Bus Sub Sub Line Line A
t l l t o l t d l l l t l l t i i t s s t ll ll t l
i I l L s S l L ll L ll L
Line Line Line
t l l t o l t d l l l t l
P B M l t
P B M
θ θ λ β δ β δ β δ β δ π
θ θ λ β
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
− − ≤ + + + ∀ ∀
− − ≥ −
, )∑ ∑ ∑
* * *
, , , )   ,  ( )
Bus Sub Line
i s l
Line Bus Bus Sub Sub Line Line A
l t i i t s s t ll ll t l
i I l L s S l L ll L ll L
l tδ β δ β δ β δ +
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
+ + + ∀ ∀∑ ∑ ∑ ,π
                  (IDC-R′.1) 
 
The revised interdiction model with restoration, (I-R′), becomes: 





t tP P S θδ
    subject to: 
  (I-R.1), (I-R.2) 
  (IDC-R′.1) 
  (IDC-R.2) to (IDC-R.6) 
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 Accordingly, the inner power-flow problem can be called (DC-OPR-R′): 





t tP P S θ
    subject to: 
  (IDC-R′.1)  
  (IDC-R.2) to (IDC-R.6) 
 
where we assume a given interdiction plan ˆδ δ= . 
 
4.3 Duality:  Converting the Model into a Simple Mixed-Integer Program 







, , , , , ,
, , , , , ,
,
max max   ( )   ( )






L L Line A A B Bus A A
l l t l l t l t l t i i t l t l
l t i I l L
Sub Sub A A L Line A A
t s s t l t l t ll ll t l t l






λ β δ π π β δ π π





∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
 − + −















( ) , ( ( )) ,
| ( ) | 1 | ( ( )) |
, ,
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(1 ) (1 )
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G Bus GB G Sub GS
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δ π δ π





+ − + −
+ − + −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑











, , , , , , , ,
| 1 | 1
, , , ,
|
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l L t
L Bus LB LB L Sub LS LS
l i t l i t l i l s t l s t l s
t ti I l L s S l L
L Line LL LL














= =∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
−
+ − − + −
+ − −
∑ ∑








i c t i c





                                (D-I-R′.0) 
subject to: 
• Dual constraints for power generation: 
 
0 0
, ( ) , , , ( ) , ( ) , ( ( )) , ( ( )) , ,(1 ) ( ) , ,     ( )
G GBal G G I Bus GB S Bus GS G
t i g t g t g g t g i g t i g t g s i g t s i g t g g t gD t h t g Pπ λ π λ π λ β π λ β π+ − + + + ≤ ∀  
                                (D-I-R′.1) 
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 • Dual constraints for power flow on lines: 
 
( )








, , , , , , , , , , , , ,
, 1






s t s l
L L LA A L Line LCap L Line LCap LB LB
t l t l t l t l t l l t l t l l t l t l t l i t l i
i I l L
LS LS LL LL
t l s t l s t l ll t l ll
s S l L ll L ll L
β
β
π π λ π π λ β π λ β π π π
π π π π
− ++ + +
+ +
∈ ∈ =
∈ ∈ = ∈ ∈
+ + − + + + + +




, ( ) , ( ) ,
, 1








− + = ∀∑  
          (D-I-R′.2) 
• Dual constraints for power shedding: 
 
, , , t,i,c( ) ,         , ,      (S )
Bal Load
t i t i c icD t f t i cπ π+ ≤ ⋅ ∀               (D-I-R′.3) 
 
• Dual constraints for phase angles: 
 
( ) ( )- -, , , , t
( ) ( )
0,      ,    ( )A A A Al t l t l l t l t l
l o l i l d l i
B B ,it iπ π π π+ +
= =
− + + + = ∀∑ ∑ θ    (D-I-R′.4) 
 












0                           
 
0   
, , ,  , ,
, , ,  , , 0
, , ,  0
                   
Bal
LCap LB LS LL







π π π π π π
π π π π π π
π π π π
π
− − − − −





             (D-I-R′.5) 
 
• Interdiction resource (same as (I-R.1) and (I-R.2)): 
 
              
* * * *G L I S
Gen Gen Line Line Bus Bus Sub Sub
g g l l i i s s
g l i s
M M M Mδ δ δ δ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
+ + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ M≤
           
     (I-R.1) 
 
All δ -variables are binary
                   
     (I-R.2) 
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 In outline, this model is: 
(D-I-R′):      (D-I-R′.0) max min
πδ
     subject to: 
 (I-R.1), (I-R.2)  
              (D-I-R′.1) to (D-I-R′.5) 
 
4.4 Linearizing Cross-products in the Objective Function 
The objective function (D-I-R′.0) contains cross-products of the form δπ .  Using the 
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                 (D-I-R′′.1) 
 
for every linearized cross-product.  These constraints are specified, in detail, in Appendix B. 
 
The final model, in outline form, is: 




    subject to: 
  (I-R.1), (I-R.2)   
  (D-I-R′.1) to (D-I-R′.5) 
  (D-I-R′′.1) 
 
Model (D-I-R′′) is the culmination of all the linearizations and dualizations described 
previously.  It exhibits multiple advantages:  The most important one is to represent the 
interdiction problem as standard, compact, mixed-integer program (MIP).  That means that any of 
the generic optimization techniques available for solving, bounding, or approximating the 
solution to a MIP are applicable to this model. 
 
Hereafter, we refer to model (D-I-R′′) as (I-MIP), i.e., “Interdiction problem in MIP form.” 
 
5.  TEST CASES 
We present a summary of results to show: 
 
(a) the benefit of incorporating system restoration into our analysis, and  
(b) the potential of the MIP reformulation, which can be solved exactly. 
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 For item (a), we will compare the enhanced heuristic with system restoration (I-ALG-R) with 
the former heuristic (I-ALG).  For item (b), we will compare the heuristic solution provided by  
(I-ALG-R) with the exact solution obtained by solving the MIP reformulation (I-MIP). 
 
Our tests are carried out on the same set of IEEE reliability test networks (“One” and “Two” 
Areas) described in our previous report.  Assumptions regarding outage duration are summarized 
in the following table: 
 
Grid Component Interdictable Resources M  
(no. of terrorists)
Outage Duration (h) 
Lines (overhead) YES 1 72 
Lines (underground) NO N/A* N/A* 
Transformers YES 2 768 
Buses YES 3 360 
Generators NO N/A* N/A* 
Substations YES 3 768 
*Not Applicable. 
Data for outage durations (i.e., repair or replacement times) are based loosely on IEEE  
[1999-I].  Outage duration for transformers is 768 hours.  For overhead lines, instead of the 10 or 
11 hours used in IEEE [1999-I], we are more conservative and assume 72 hours.  This is justified 
because (a) we expect more damage to result from the intentional destruction of a line—this would 
probably involve the destruction of one or more towers [Miami Herald, 2002]—than the average 
time needed to repair damage from common natural causes such as lightning, and (b) if n lines and 
other grid elements are attacked, total repair time may be longer if fewer than n repair teams are 
available.  We also assume that a large substation requires 768 hours for repair, but buses, for 
which IEEE [1999-I] provides no data, require 360 hours. 
 
5.1 Comparing Solutions with and without System Restoration 
Although in both cases below I-ALG finds better short-term disruptions (compare power 
shed) over the first 72 hours following the attack, it is clear that long-term effects are better 
captured by I-ALG-R: 
 








   0-72 h 1,373 98,856 RTS-One-Area 
I-ALG Lines: A11, A20, A21, A25-1, A27, A33-1 Total: 98,856 
   0-72 h 902 64,944 





Substations: Sub-A2 Total: 557,712 
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   0-72 h 2,516 181,152 RTS-Two-Areas 
I-ALG 
Lines: A20, A21, A27, A33-1, A35-1, AB2, 
B20, B21, B25-1, B27, B33-1, B34 Total: 181,152 
   0-768 1,416 1,087,488 RTS-Two-Areas 
I-ALG-R Substations: Sub-A1, Sub-A2, Sub-B1, Sub-B2 Total: 1,087,488 
 
Although our goal is focused on long-term disruption, we recognize that the optimal solution 
provided by the I-ALG model is still an insightful measure of vulnerability in the analysis of 
short-term effects. 
 
5.2 Comparing Heuristic and Optimal Solutions 
First Goal:  Optimal short-term disruption.  In this case we are comparing I-ALG with a 
special version of the I-MIP model, in which there is only one period “t = 1,” the duration of this 
period is 1D = 1 hour, and the duration outage for all interdictable elements e ξ∈  is  
1 hour. ( )Dur e =
 
From the next two tables, the heuristic solution for optimal short-term disruption (provided 
by I-ALG) is of good quality when compared to the best possible provided by (I-MIP): 
 





I-ALG Lines: A11, A20, A21, A25-1, A27, A33-1 1,373 
RTS-One-Area 
I-MIP Lines: A11, A20, A21, A25-2, A27, A33-1 1,373 
 






Lines: A20, A21, A27, A33-1, A35-1, AB2, 
B20, B21, B25-1, B27, B33-1, B34 2,516 
RTS-Two-Areas 
I-MIP 
Lines: A21, A25-1, A27, A33-1, B18, B21,  
B25-1, B27, B33-2 2,781 
 
However, this quality deteriorates when interdiction resource increases: 
 






Buses: 118, 123, 216, 217 
Substations: Sub-A1, Sub-A2, Sub-B1, Sub-B2 3,266 
RTS-Two-Areas 
I-MIP 
Lines: A21, A33-1, A34, B21, B27, B33-1 
Buses: 113, 115, 118, 213, 215, 218 4,142 
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 This shows the MIP optimal solution may outperform the solution provided by the 
heuristic algorithm by 25% in some cases. 
 
Second Goal:  Optimal long-term disruption.  In this case, we are comparing I-ALG-R with 
the I-MIP configured for a total horizon of 768 hours, which is the longer time to repair for any 
component in our test cases. 
 
Again, the first two tables below show that the heuristic solution for optimal long-term 
disruption (provided by I-ALG-R) is acceptable for the cases tested. 
 








   0-72 h 902 64,944 
72-768 h 708 492,768 RTS-One-Area I-ALG-R 
Lines: A23 
Transformers: A7 
Substations: Sub-A2 Total: 557,712 
   0-72 h 902 64,944 
72-768 h 708 492,768 RTS-One-Area I-MIP 
Lines: A23 
Transformers: A7 
Substations: Sub-A2 Total: 557,712 
 








   0-768 1,416 1,087,488 RTS-Two-Areas 
I-ALG-R Substations: Sub-A1, Sub-A2, Sub-B1, Sub-B2 Total: 1,087,488 
   0-72 h 1,804 129,888 
72-768 h 1,416 985,536 RTS-Two-Areas I-MIP 
Lines: A23, B23 
Transformers: A7, B7 
Substations: Sub-A2, Sub-B2 Total: 1,115,424 
 
In the case below, the solution provided by the heuristic for a problem with a larger 
interdiction resource value still exhibits acceptable quality. 
 








  0-360 h 2,693 969,480 
360-768 h 1,416 577,728 
RTS-Two-Areas 
I-ALG-R Buses: 116, 118, 215, 218 Substations: Sub-A1, Sub-A2, Sub-B1, Sub-B2 
Total: 1,547,208 
   0-72 h 3,164 227,808 
72-360 h 2,716 782,208 
360-720 h 1,416 577,728 
RTS-Two-Areas 
I-MIP 
Lines: A30, A33-2 
Transformers: A7, B7 
Buses: 115, 118, 215, 218 
Substations: Sub-A2, Sub-B2 Total: 1,587,744 
 
6.  Vulnerability of Electric Power Grid Analyzer (VEGA) 
6.1 Overview 
VEGA is an integrated decision-support system comprising a GUI, a relational database 
management system (RDBMS), an optimization module, and an administration program that 
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 controls all of those components (Figure 3).  VEGA 1.0 is the first version of this system and has 
been built on the Microsoft (MS) Windows 2000 operating system [Microsoft 2003].  This 
section provides an overview of VEGA. 
Figure 3.  VEGA decision support system. 
 
The ultimate goals of VEGA are to enable access to our analytical techniques for a wide 
range of potential users, including students in the HSLD curriculum, and to bridge the gap 
between the underlying mathematical optimization methods and the decision-makers.  A 
preliminary Web page has been set up for this project [VEGA, 2003]. 
 
The GUI and database (DB) are key to organizing planning data, reducing clerical error 
through embedded validations, completing missing details, filtering information according to 
user’s needs, and displaying multiple scenarios with their results, for comparison purposes.  The 
GUI is also key for demonstrating the potential that optimization techniques have for planning 
interdiction and interdiction defense. 
 
The GUI helps prepare power-network data for analysis, and then displays analytical results, 
by enabling easy navigation through customized tables and graphics containing problem data and 
results.  This gives a user easy access to the mathematical analysis of a problem even if the user 
in not an expert in mathematical modeling and optimization. 
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 The VEGA optimization module performs the mathematical analysis of the problem 
independently of the GUI.  The purpose of the GUI is to prepare the case data to be analyzed and 
to retrieve and display the optimization results in a user-friendly fashion.  VEGA 1.0’s core is an 
optimization model that assesses the maximum possible disruption a network might experience 
from a terrorist attack.  Naturally, this core can work as independent entity, and its operation is, in 
fact, transparent to the user of VEGA. 
 
The administration program and the GUI are implemented in the MS Visual Basic (VB) 6.0 
programming language [Microsoft, 1998], supported by a RDBMS implemented with  
MS Access 2000 [Microsoft, 2003].  The underlying optimization module is implemented using 
GAMS [GAMS, 2003, Brooke et al., 1996].  Data transfer and synchronization of the GUI with 
GAMS are performed by means of plain ASCII files, because GAMS is not available as a callable 
or dynamic library; therefore, GAMS executes as an external program. 
 
6.2 VEGA GUI Overview 
The front-end application responsible for the VEGA GUI uses a Windows-based 
methodology that facilitates for the user: 
a. Network data input; 
b. Other data input, including possible scenarios, optimization parameters, etc.; 
c. Analyzing results provided by the optimization model; 
d. Graphical display of the network, input data, and output results; and 
e. Administration of multiple cases with several scenarios per case. 
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 Figure 4.  Examples of VEGA data tables. 
 
The GUI in VEGA 1.0 uses VB tables in order to import data from the database, and edit the 
records associated with a problem.  Figure 4 shows an example of data tables for Buses and 
Generators. 
 
Upon completing necessary data entry, the user can invoke the optimization module to 
produce optimal, or near-optimal, interdiction plans.  These plans can be displayed in tabular 
form (Figure 5) or in graphical form (Figure 6). 
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Figure 5.  Interdiction plan shown in tabular form. 
 
Figure 6.  Graphical representation of overall results by scenario (left) and by scenario and time (right). 
One important, recent accomplishment has been the enhancement of a module in the VEGA 
GUI called the “One-Line Diagram (OD) GUI.”  ODs are used by electrical engineers to 
represent electric power grids graphically.  The VEGA 1.0 (see VEGA [2003]) OD GUI had 
many limitations that have been overcome through the thesis research of an NPS student 
[Stathakos, 2003].  Figure 7 shows one of the new OD representations. 
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Figure 7.  One-Line Diagram for an electric network under interdiction. 
 
The above snapshots are intended to give an overview of the VEGA GUI, only, and a full 
report on its capabilities will be provided in a separate, future report. 
 
7.  OTHER ACTIVITIES 
7.1 Thesis Students 
To date, two students have devoted their Master’s thesis research to our project,  
Major Dimitrios Sthatakos (Greek Army) and LCDR Roger Alvarez (USN). 
 
Major Sthatakos, who graduated in December 2003, enhanced the one-line diagram (OD) 
interface in our VEGA GUI.  The OD GUI represents the details of power flows and interdictions 
graphically (Figure 7).  Major Sthatakos created a highly flexible OD GUI by replacing a 
prototypic OD GUI (based on standard Visual Basic objects) with an advanced OD GUI based on 
state-of-the-art ActiveX controls.  For more information, see Sthatakos [2003]. 
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 LCDR Alvarez is currently working on the MIP representation of our mathematical models 
(see Section 4) and on their solvability.  He has been instrumental in completing many of the 
refinements to the MIP described in this report, and he is exploring alternative solution 
techniques for the MIP, with special focus on Benders decomposition.  He is expected to graduate 
in March 2004 [Alvarez, 2004]. 
 
We continue to seek the involvement of NPS students in our project. 
 
7.2 Other Reports and Activities 
In addition to our previous report [Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick, 2003-I], our first year’s 
work has yielded a refereed publication:  “Analysis of Electric Grid Security Under Terrorist 
Threat,” [Salmeron, Wood, and Baldick, 2003-II], which will appear in IEEE Transactions on 
Power Systems.  The feedback from the four reviewers was highly positive.  
 
Also, our work was presented in the CS3660 seminar (Critical Infrastructure Protection) as 
part of the recently created HSLD curriculum at NPS. 
 
7.3 Other Sources of Funding 
The Department of Justice has been our sole source of funding to date.  We are seeking 
additional research support from the Department of Energy (proposal submitted) and the  
National Science Foundation (proposal in preparation). 
 
8.  FUTURE WORK 
The major challenge we face in the present year is to obtain actual U.S. power-grid data for 
testing and validating our methodology.  In doing so, we need to continue the development of 
techniques to solve the exact models (MIPs) for those cases and other realistically sized 
problems.  (See the proposal, Salmeron, and Wood [2003], for more detail.)  Currently, we are 
acquiring data sets for different areas in the U.S. North American Electric Reliability Council 
system, and we are adapting and extending those data for our purposes. We have had success in 
formulating our models as MIPs, but additional development and experimentation is needed in 
order to be able to solve them efficiently.  In particular, we will be investigating special bounding 
techniques and specialized cutting-plane techniques (Geoffrion, [1972], Israeli and Wood 
[2002]). 
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 During the coming year, we will also: 
• Continue to work on the VEGA GUI; 
• Extend our models and algorithms to capture the dynamics of load variation over 
time.  This requires extension of the VEGA optimization module, as well as the 
VEGA database and GUI (at the levels of data and result management and of 
graphical representations); and 
• Initiate work on trilevel models to identify optimal protection plans for power grids. 
 
9.  VALUE OF THE RESEARCH TO HOMELAND SECURITY 
The call for proposals that this research addresses, asks how our research adds value to the 
Homeland Security effort.  We respond as follows: 
 
 Simulation software for Homeland Security (HLS): 
- Attacks on critical infrastructure:  Power Grids 
 
 Deliverables (this document): 
- Models and algorithms (as presented) 
- Case studies (as presented) 
- Software (optimization algorithms and GUI under development) 
- Publications (as presented) 
 
By criterion used to fund the project: 
- This research addresses an important problem in HLS 
- This research adds to the body of HLS knowledge 
- This research is interdisciplinary 
- This research is novel and useful 
- This research invites non-NPS collaborators 
- Principal Investigators (PIs) have a reputation in the proposed field of study 
- PIs will try to get students involved in this research and produce theses 
- Results will be publishable 
- Results will be useful in teaching HLS courses 
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 APPENDIX A:  SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS NOTATION 
 
Indices and index sets: 
 
i ∈I , buses 
g ∈G , generating units 
l ∈L , transmission lines 
c ∈C , consumer sectors 
s∈S , substations 
si ∈I , buses at substation s 
ig ∈G , generating units connected to bus i 
Bus
il ∈L ,  lines connected to bus i 
Sub
sl ∈L ,  lines connected to substation s (including transformers, which are represented by lines) 
Par
ll′∈L , lines l   running in parallel to line l l
S
′ ≠
* ⊆G G , , , S , interdictable generators, lines, buses, and substations, respectively.  
These are “interdictable components.” 




o(l), d(l), origin and destination buses of line l; more than one line with the same o(l), d(l) may 
exist 
i(g), bus for generator g, i.e.,  ( )i gg ∈G
s(i), substation for bus i, for i  | I∈ s S∃ ∈  where si I∈  
dic , load of consumer sector c at bus i (MW) 
Line
lP , transmission capacity for line l (MW) 
Gen
gP ,  maximum output from generator g (MW) 
rl, xl , resistance, reactance of line l (Ω).  (We assume xl >> rl.); series susceptance is 
2 2/( )l l l lB x r x= +  
hg , generation cost for unit g ($/MWh) 
fic , load-shedding cost for customer sector c at bus i ($/MWh) 
Gen
gM , LinelM , 
Bus
iM , SubsM , resource required to interdict generator g, line l, bus i, and substation s, 
respectively. 
M , total interdiction resource available to terrorists. 
 
 
Decision variables (units): 
 
Gen
gP  , generation from unit g (MW) 
Line
lP  , power flow on line l (MW) 
icS  , load shed by customer sector c at bus i (MW) 
iθ  , phase angle at bus i (radians) 
Gen
gδ , Linelδ , Busiδ , Subsδ , binary variables that take the value 1 if generator g, line l, bus i or substation s, 
respectively, are interdicted, and are 0 otherwise. 
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 APPENDIX B:  LINEARIZATION OF CROSS-PRODUCTS 
 










, , , ,
( , )
( , )
,    
,    
, , | , , 1   ( )
0 , | , , 1
, | , , 1
( )
(1 ) ( )
A A Line Line A
t l t l l t l t l
A A Line
t l t l t l
A A A Line Line





v t l l L t T
v t l l L t T
v t l l L t T
π δ β γ
π β








≤ ∀ ∈ ∈ =
∀ ∈ ∈ =
∀ ∈ ∈ =
− ≤






, , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , ,
, , , | , , , =1 ( )
0, , , | , , , =1 ( )
(1 ), , , | , , , =1
BA A Bus Bus Bus BA
t l i t l i i t i t l i
BA A Bus Bus BA
t l i t l i t i t l i
BA A A Bus Bus Bus
t l i t l t l i i t i
v t i l i I l L t T
v t i l i I l L t T
v t i l i I l L t T
π δ β γ
π β γ




≤ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈
− ≤ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈
− ≥ − − ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈
3( , , )













, , , | , , , =1 ( )
0, , , | , , , =1 
(1 ), , , | , , ,
( )
SA A Sub Sub Sub SA
t l s t l s s t s t l s
A Sub Sub SA
t l s t s t l s
A A Sub Sub Sub





v t s l s S l L t T
t s l s S l L t T
t s l s S l L t T
v
v
π δ β γ
π β γ






≤ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈
∀ ∈ ∈ ∈
− − ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈
− ≤
− ≥
3( , , )
=1 ( )SAt l sγ +






, , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , ,
, , , | , , , =1 ( )
0, , , | , , , =1
, , | ,
( )
(1 )
LA A Line Par Line LA
t l ll t l ll l t ll t l ll
LA A Par Line LA
t l ll t l l t ll t l ll
LA A A Line
t l ll t l t l ll
v t l ll ll L ll L t T
v t l ll ll L ll L t T
v t l ll ll L






≤ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈
∀ ∈ ∈ ∈
∀ ∈
− ≤
− ≥ − −
3, ( ,







, , , ( , )
*
, , , ( , )
*
, , , , ( , )
, , , , =1 ( )
0, , , , =1 ( )
(1 ), , , , =1 ( )
L L Line Line L
t l t l l t l t l
L L Line L
t l t l t l t l
L L L Line Line L
t l t l t l l t l t l
v t l L t T
v t l L t T
v t l L t T
π δ β γ
π β γ




≤ ∀ ∈ ∈
− ≤ ∀ ∈ ∈







, , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , , ,
,
,
, , , | , , , =1 ( )
0 , , | , , , =1
(1 ) , , | , , ,
( )
LB L Bus Bus Bus LB
t l i t l i i t i t l i
LB LB Bus Bus LB
t l i t l i i t i t l i
LB LB L Bus Bus
t l i t l i t l i i t
v t l i i I l L t T
v t l i i I l L t T
v t l i i I l L t T
π δ β γ
π β γ




≤ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈
∀ ∈ ∈ ∈
− − ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈
− ≤
− ≥
3( , , )





, , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , , ,
,
,
, , , | , , , 1 ( )
0 , , | , , , 1
, , | , , ,
( )
(1 )
LS L Sub Sub Sub LS
t l s t l s s t s t l s
LS LS Sub Sub LS
t l s t l s s t s t l s
LS LS L Sub Sub
t l s t l s t l s s t
v t s l s S l L t T
v t s l s S l L t T
v t s l s S l L t T
π δ β γ
π β γ




≤ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =
∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =
∀ ∈ ∈ ∈
− ≤
− ≥ − −
3( , , )






, , , l , ( , , )
* Par
, , , , l , ( , , )
, , , , ,
,
,
, , , | ,ll L , , =1 ( )
0 , , | ,ll L , , =1 ( )
(1 ) , ,
LL L Line Line LL
t l ll t l ll t ll t l ll
LL LL Line LL
t l ll t l ll t ll t l ll
LL LL L Line
t l ll t l ll t l ll
v t l ll ll L t T
v t l ll ll L t T
v t l l
γ






≤ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈






l , (| ,ll L , , =1 (
Line LL







, , , ( , )
*
, , , ( , )
*
, , , , ( ,
,
,
, , | , , =1 ( )
0 , | , , =1 ( )
(1 ) , | , , =1 ( )
A A Line L ine A
t l t l l t l t l
A A L ine A
t l t l t l t l
A A A L ine L ine A
t l t l t l l t l t l
v t l l L t T
v t l l L t T
v t l l L t T
π δ β γ
π β γ




≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈
− ≥ ∀ ∈ ∈







, , , , ( , , )
, , , , ( , , )




, , , , =1 ( )
0, , , , =1 ( )
(1 ), , , , =1
Bus
i
BA A Bus Bus BA
t l i t l i t i t l i
BA A Bus Bus BA
t l i t l i t i t l i
BA A A Bus Bus Bus
t l i t l t l i i t i
t i l i I
t i l i I
t i l i I
v l L t T
v l L t T
v l L t
δπ β
π β







≥ − ∈ ∈
− ≥ ∀ ∈ ∈
− ≤ − ∀ ∈ ∈
3( , , )







, , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , ,
0,
,
, , , | , , , 1 ( )
, , | , , , 1 ( )
(1 ) , , | , , , 1
SA A Sub Sub Sub SA
t l s t l s s t s t l s
SA A Sub Sub SA
t l s t l s t s t l s
SA A A Sub Sub Sub
t l s t l t l s s t s
v t s l s S l L t T
v t s l s S l L t T
t s l s S l L t Tv
γ
π δ β γ
π β






≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =
− ≥ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =
− ≤ − ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =
3( , , )







, , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , ( , , )
*
, , , ,
,
,
, , , | , , , 1 ( )
0 , , | , , , 1 (
(1 ) , , | ,
)
LA A Line Par Line LA
t l ll t l ll l t ll t l ll
LA A Par Line LA
t l ll t l l t ll t l ll
LA A A Line
t l ll t l t l ll
v t l ll ll L ll L t T
v t l ll ll L ll L t T
v t l ll ll L






≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =
− ≥ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =
− ≤ − ∀ ∈
3, ( ,









, , t,l ( , )
* Line
, , t,l ( , )
* Line
, , , t,l ( , )
, , | , t T , =1 ( )
0, , | , t T , =1 ( )




t l t l t l
L L L
t l t l t l
L L L Line L
t l t l t l l t l
v t l l L
v t l l L
v t l l L
δπ β γ
π β γ




∀≥ − ∈ ∈
− ≥ ∀ ∈ ∈










2, , , , ( , , )
, , , , ,
, , , | , ,t T, =1 ( )
, , , | , ,t T, =1
, , , | , ,t T,
0 (
(1 )
LB L Bus Bus LB






t l i t l i t l i
LB LB L Bus
t l i t l i t l i
v t i l i I l L
t i l i I l L
t i l i I l L
v
v




















, , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , , ,
,
,
, , , | , , , 1 ( )
0 , , | , , , 1 (
(1 ) , , | , , ,
)
LS L Sub Sub Sub LS
t l s t l s s t s t l s
LS LS Sub Sub LS
t l s t l s s t s t l s
LS LS L Sub Sub
t l s t l s t l s s t
v t s l s S l L t T
v t s l s S l L t T
v t s l s S l L t T
π δ β γ
π β




≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =
− ≥ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =
− ≤ − ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈
3( , , )






2( , , )
*
, , , , ( , , )
*
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
,
,
, , , | , , , 1 ( )
0 , , | , , , 1 ( )
(1 ) , , |
LL
t l ll
LL L Line Par Line LL
t l ll t l ll l t ll t l ll
LL LL Par Line
t l ll t l ll l t ll
LL LL L
t l ll t l ll t l ll
v t l ll ll L ll L t T
v t l ll ll L ll L t T
v t l ll ll







≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =
− ≥ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =
− ≤ − ∀
3( , , )
*













, , , ( , )
*
, , , ( , )
*
, , , , ( ,
,
,
, , | , , 1 ( )
0 , | , , 1 ( )
(1 ) , | , , 1 ( )
G G G Gen G
t g t g g t g t g
G G Gen G
t g t g t g t g
G G G G Gen G
t g t g t g g t g t g
v t g g G t T
v t g g G t T
v t g g G t T
π δ β γ
π β γ
π π δ β γ
≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈ =
− ≥ ∀ ∈ ∈ =








, , ( ) , ( ) ( , )
*
, , , ( ) ( , )
*
, , , ( ) , ( ) ( , )
,
,
, , | ( ) , , 1 ( )
0 , | ( ) , , 1 ( )
(1 ) , | ( ) , , 1 ( )
GB G Bus Bus GB
t g t g i g t i g t g
GB GB Bus GB
t g t g t i g t g
GB GB G Bus Bus GB




t g i g I t T
t g i g I t T
t g i g I t T γ
π δ β γ
π β γ
π π δ β
≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈ =
− ≥ ∀ ∈ ∈ =








, , ( ( )) , ( ( )) ( , )
, , , ( ( )) ( , )
, , , ( ( )) , ( ( ))
, | ( ( ))
, | ( ( ))
, | ( ( ))
, , , 1 ( )
0, , , 1 ( )
(1 ), , ,
GS G Sub Sub GS
t g t g s i g t s i g t g
GS GS Sub GS
t g t g t s i g t g
GS GS G Sub Su
t g t g t g s i g t s i g
t g s i g S
t g s i g S










≥ − ∈ =
− ≥ ∈ =
− ≤ − ∈
3( , )








, , , ,,
, , | , ( )
, | , , 1 ( )
A A A
t l t l t l
L L Line L
t l t l t l t l
t l l L t T
t l l L t T
π π η
π π β η
+ +
+ +
≤ ∀ ∈ ∈
≤ ∀ ∈ ∈ =  
 
, , , , ,
, , , , , ,





, , , | ( )
, , , | , , 1 ( )
, , | , , 1 ( )




t l i t l t l i
LS L Sub LS
t l s t l t s t l s
LL L line LL







t l i i I L
t l s s S l L t T
t l ll ll L ll L t T
l t Tπ π η
π π β η




≤ ∀ ∈ ∈
≤ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =








, , | , ( )
, , | , , 1 (
A A A
t l t l t l
L L Line
t l t l t l t l
t l l L t T






≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈




, , , , , ,
*
, , , , , ,
*
, , , , , ,
,
,
, , , | , , , 1 ( )
, , | , , , 1 ( )
, , | , , , 1 ( )
LB L Bus Bus LB
t l i t l i t i t l i
LS L Sub Sub LS
t l s t l s t s t l s
LL L Par line LL
t l ll t l l t ll t l ll
t l i i I l L t T
t l s s S l L t T
t l ll ll L ll L t T
π π β η
π π β η




≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =
≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =




, , , ,
*
, , , ( ) ,
*
, , , ( ( ))
, , | , , 1 ( )
, , | ( ) , , 1 ( )
, , | ( ( )) , , 1 (
G G Gen G
t g t g t g t g
GB G Gen GB
t g t g t i g t g
GS G Gen GS
t g t g t s i g t g
t g g G t T
t g i g I t T
t g s i g S t T
π π β η
π π β η
π π β η
≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈ =
≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈ =
≥ − ∀ ∈ ∈ = , )
 
 39
 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
 
1. Research Office (Code 09).........................................................................................................1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
2. Dudley Knox Library (Code 013)..............................................................................................2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5002 
3. Defense Technical Information Center ......................................................................................2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  22060-6218 
4. Richard Mastowski (Editorial Assistant) ...................................................................................2 
Department of Operations Research 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5219 
5. Darrell Darnel ............................................................................................................................3 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Justice Programs 
810 Seventh St., NW 
Washington, DC  20531 
darnelld@ojp.usdoj.gov 
6. Paul Stockton (Code 04) ............................................................................................................1 
Department of Operations Research 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5219 
pstockton@ojp.usdoj.gov 
7. Ted Lewis (Code CS/Lt)............................................................................................................1 
Department of Computer Science 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5118 
8. Javier Salmeron (Code OR/Sa)..................................................................................................3 
Department of Operations Research 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5219 
9. Kevin Wood (Code OR/Wd) .....................................................................................................3 
Department of Operations Research 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5219 
 40
 10. Ross Baldick ..............................................................................................................................3 
Department of Electrical Engineering  
University of Texas at Austin 
Austin, TX  78712-1084 
 
 41
